The paper compares how di¤erent contractual environments support invention and implementation. Innovative but incomplete ideas require feedback and elaboration by other agents, yet when shared they may be stolen. Markets, as open exchange systems, are good for idea circulation and thus elaboration, but may fail to reward idea generation. Firms, as controlled idea exchange systems, can reward idea generation but restrict their circulation. A key …nding is that an e¢ cient environment requires a symbiotic relationship between markets and open …rms, where ideas are allowed to cross …rm boundaries. This interaction optimizes the basic trade-o¤ between protecting rewards to invention and the best implementation of ideas.
Introduction
The role of innovation in economic growth is well recognized (Romer, 1990 ), yet the process of generating innovative ideas is still a novel …eld of inquiry. The literature has focused on the role of intellectual property rights as incentive for invention (Nordhaus, 1969, Gallini and Scotchmer, 2001 ). We focus here on an earlier stage in the innovation process, where ideas are still half-baked so they cannot yet be patented, yet need to be shared in order to be further screened and elaborated. We study how di¤erent contracting environments promote the development of novel concepts, in the process exploring the notion that a free circulation of ideas may be as critical for innovation as their protection. Our main result is that the most innovative environment requires a symbiotic interaction between large …rms and market-intermediated start ups. We show why established …rms may specialize in incubating ideas, while markets (in the sense of open idea exchanges without a governance structure) are complementary, elaborating those ideas which do not …t …rms.
The technological success of new ventures in Silicon Valley is often taken as evidence that innovation thrives in a free market environment. Yet any history of Silicon Valley essentially comprises a long list of talented people leaving large …rms with novel ideas. According to Bhidé (2000) , over 70 % of the founders of …rms in the Inc. 500 list of fast growing high tech …rms developed ideas encountered in previous employment. Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) and Klepper and Sleeper (2002) provide evidence that established …rms play a major role as incubators for innovative ideas which later are developed in new ventures by departing employees.
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Following Schumpeter (1926 Schumpeter ( , 1942 we de…ne an idea as a novel combination of existing factors (see also Biais and Perotti, 2004, and Weitzman, 1998) . In this paper we study early stage ideas, de…ned as incompletely speci…ed. An incomplete idea needs to be shared with agents who have expertise that is complementary to the inventor's. Yet in the case of a truly novel idea, it is not obvious in which direction it should be developed, and thus what may be the "missing" expertise. Innovative concepts cannot be planned as by de…nition their development cannot be well anticipated. As a result, a broad circulation of ideas is critical for innovation, as it allows maximum chance of elaboration. Saxenian (1994) emphasizes "cross-pollination"and open networking as a main cause of Silicon Valley's innovative success.
Yet there is a fundamental problem with the open circulation of ideas, namely that they can be easily stolen (Arrow, 1962) . This is particularly true for ideas that are incomplete, and thus too vague for an independent patent o¢ ce to grant exclusive property rights.
2 Similar to Yao (1994, 2002) , we argue that 1 Most R&D is still performed in established …rms. The National Science Foundation estimates private industrial R&D spending at $180 billion in 2003 (latest available data). In comparison, the National Venture Capital Association reported investments in venture capital backed companies amounting to $18 billion.
2 The well-known Yale survey found that patent protection is only one among many ways that …rms protect their intellectual property, and that patents only matter for a limited set of industries agents will not agree to sign a contract on an idea without knowing its content in advance. In practice, such "non-disclosure agreements"(NDAs henceforth) are never used by agents repeatedly involved in assessing new ideas, such as venture capitalists and Hollywood producers. Since agents are unwilling to sign such blind contracts, incomplete ideas must be shared without contractual protection. 3 We characterize the process of elaborating incomplete ideas as a unguided search for some complementary expertise the inventor does not possess. This need to circulate ideas in an unstructured fashion, however, con ‡icts with the ability to prevent their appropriation, and thereby reward its generation. In our model, an inventor must …nd a partner with complementary skills (a "complementor") who is able to elaborate the initial concept. If the inventor meets a complementor, both parties have incentives to cooperate. Alternatively, the inventor may meet an agent whose skills essentially replicate his own, which we term a "substitute." A substitute understands the idea, but is unable to elaborate on it and thus cannot gain from the interaction. We show that he has an incentive to steal the idea and seek to complete it with other partners. In an open exchange environment such as a market, ideas will circulate through a sequence of agents, not necessarily their inventors, until matched to a complementor. From a social perspective, a free circulation of ideas is e¢ cient in ensuring their elaboration, yet cause frequent idea stealing which may deny the inventor a su¢ cient reward for invention.
We argue that …rms emerge as a solution to this market failure. Agents who accept employment in a …rm agree, as part of their labor contract, to be bound by trade secret law. This e¤ectively constitutes a broad non disclosure agreement on all ideas actively explored inside the …rm. In exchange, the …rm has to commit to reward inventors, a commitment which we argue is backed by its reputation. Reputation is modeled as the outcome of a sunk investment that large …rms make in order to establish visibility among a limited set of agents (Kreps, 1986) . The threat of loss of corporate reputation ensures that agents would contractually commit to sharing and not stealing ideas inside the …rm, while they would refuse to sign an equivalent contract with an individual agent. An advantage of …rms vis-à-vis market agents is that they provide a safe idea exchange not only with their owners, but also among the set of other employees.
The model implies an internal organization of the …rm which "registers"employee ideas as internal projects and "credits" their inventors. A veri…able paper trail has a double purpose. First, it enables the …rm to commit to reward idea generators. Second, it enables to lay a claim on the idea, ensuring that no employee may take an internally generated idea outside the …rm, i.e., it helps to establish a …rm's trade (Levin et. al., 1987) . 3 We also develop a model extension that formally explains why not signing an NDA is a natural equilibrium outcome. If the agent receives the information …rst, then he longer bene…ts from signing the NDA. But if the agent hasn't seen the information, then the agent exposes him/herself to a risk of extortion.
secret. This provides a speci…c justi…cation for the bureaucracy associated with large …rms (Novaes and Zingales, 2004) .
Firms, however, have important drawbacks. Reputation creation may be expensive, and monitoring the out ‡ow of ideas may be costly. More fundamentally, containing ideas within …rm boundaries limits the set of possible matching expertise. This leads to our main result: just as market failure creates a need for idea-incubating …rms, …rm failure to develop some internal projects creates a role for markets to complete those ideas not elaborated inside …rms. This requires …rms to become open, in the sense of allowing employees to spin-o¤ their ideas that could not be used internally (Lewis and Yao, 2003) . Thus, in our approach …rms and markets truly complement one another, each compensating for the ine¢ ciency of the other. Firms incubate ideas, while markets increase their chances of elaboration. This complementarity suggests a natural symbiosis of open …rms and markets. 4 An interesting …nding is that while …rms individually …nd it worthwhile to allow ideas to circulate beyond their boundaries, collectively they may be worse o¤ with mobility. Idea mobility increases the returns for independent market agents to listen to ideas, and thus the cost to hiring employees. In our context, idea mobility is favorable to …rms only as long as there are few other …rms. As the density of …rms increases, the increased cost of hiring employees outweighs the direct gain of allowing spin-o¤s.
Our analysis illustrates the importance of skill complementarity for innovation. The independent exchange of ideas in markets fails when there are too few complementors, because it is di¢ cult for idea generators to capture enough value from their idea. Firms also rely on the presence of complementors, without whom too many ideas remain without an internal …t and have to be spun out into the market.
Finally, we show that market agents have a comparative advantage in developing valuable ideas requiring modest budgets, so they may account for a large fraction of radical innovations, whereas …rms may focus on larger scale, complex ideas which require substantial investments. Interestingly, this result is not a consequence of …nancial constraints (as often assumed), but rather of the di¢ culty for inventors to secure a return on their ideas in the market.
Relationship to the literature
The modern theory of the …rm shows that assets ownership is a residual right of control designed to resolve hold up problems (Williamson, 1975 , Hart, 1995 . Holmström and Roberts (1998) suggest that ideas and people should belong at the core of any theory of the …rm. Our approach integrates these views by showing how individual choices are essential for the speci…cation of corporate ownership rights on intellectual assets. An employee's idea is in principle an intangible real asset owned by the …rm, but cannot be claimed unless the employee chooses to report it.
In our model, …rms emerge as legal boundaries around people and their ideas. As in Coase (1937) , …rms compensate for market failure, and speci…cally the inability to protect inventors against idea stealing. However, …rms generate their own ine¢ ciency, by limiting idea circulation inside their boundaries. Our results points to an important symbiotic relationship between …rms and markets, with markets re…ning ideas that could not be elaborated within …rms. Our model of coexistence is consistent with the empirical evidence on …rms spawning innovative ventures (Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005, Klepper and Sleeper 2005) . Azoulay (2004) …nds that pharmaceutical …rms, while actively outsourcing in many other areas, maintain strong …rm boundaries around knowledge intensive projects. Kremp and Mairesse (2004) …nd a positive relationship between …rms' internal knowledge management systems and their innovative performance.
This paper contributes to the recent theory literature on innovation. The optimal allocation of control over observable innovative ideas is analyzed in Aghion and Tirole (1994) . Critically, ideas are non excludable, and their origin is usually unveri…able. Anton and Yao (1994) show that inventors can secure some value from their idea by threatening to transmit it further, creating more competitors. Yao (2002, 2004) consider partial disclosure of ideas, as also Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) and Cestone and White (2003) . Baccara and Razin (2006a) examine a complex bargaining game where inventors consider whether to buy out all idea holders, or whether to allow some leakage of ideas, while Baccara and Razin (2006b) extend it by examining how a …rm can provide incentive to prevent idea leakages. Rajan and Zingales (2001) examine how a hierarchy may prevent idea-stealing by granting access to its technology only to dedicated employees. Gromb and Scharfstein (2001) argue that …rms have an advantage at knowing an employee's track record, which reduces the risk of innovative investment. Cassiman and Ueda (2006) , Gambardella and Panico (2006) , and Hellmann (2006) explain why …rms may sometimes refuse to implement pro…table employee innovations. Ueda (2004) and Chemmanur and Chen (2006) examines the trade-o¤ of talking to uninformed investors who cannot steal an idea, versus venture capitalists who can. Biais and Perotti (2004) show that an unpatentable idea may be safely shared with experts in a partnership, only when their expertise is highly complementary. The current paper pursues this notion of complementarity one step further -or rather earlier -by allowing the complementary agent not just to screen, but to elaborate an initially incomplete idea.
A related literature has examined R&D spillovers across …rms (d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, Kamien, Müller and Zhang, 1992) . The literature on the open source movement also addresses the question of voluntary exchange of ideas (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Johnson, 2002) .
In section 2 we develop the basic model, focusing on idea exchanges in markets. In section 3 we develop a model of the …rm, focusing on closed …rms where ideas cannot escape. In section 4 we present a model where ideas may circulate across …rm boundaries, and where …rms and markets coexist. Section 5 provides an applied discussion, exploring several model predictions. We conclude with some thoughts for further research.
2 Idea exchange in markets
Ideas and agent types
The model has an in…nite number of periods, with a discount factor of across periods. There is a mass of agents of unit size. At the beginning of each period, agents decide whether to create a …rm (i.e., become an owner), join a …rm (i.e., become an employee) or be active in the market (i.e., become what we call a market agent). Employees and market agents can attempt to generate a new idea, at a private cost , in which case they generate an idea with probability . Idea generation is not veri…able per se. The idea is too incomplete and vague to be patentable, so idea generators need to …nd the complementary skills to further develop it. Complementarity is idea speci…c, so it is not obvious ex-ante which individual would be the right match. If a complementor is found, the idea is completed by the cooperative e¤ort of both parties, in which case it produces a payo¤ z at the end of the period. For simplicity, if two parties attempt to implement the idea non-cooperatively, Bertrand competition ensures that all payo¤s are zero.
Each period is divided in talking rounds, each of which takes an arbitrarily short time ". We focus on the case of " ! 0. In each talking round agents are matched at random and may talk about their ideas. Consider the process of …nding a complementor. We call the agent with the idea the "talker," and his match the "listener." Because ideas are independent of each other, one agent can be a talker with respect to his idea, and also be a listener with respect to the other agent's idea.
A listener can have one of two unobservable types of idea-speci…c skills. With probability , the listener is a "complementor", who upon hearing the idea knows how to complete it. With probability ( 1 ), the listener is a "substitute" who has the same skills as the talker, and thus does not know how to further elaborate the idea. We assume that the process of sharing an idea reveals the agent's type (e.g., the questions asked in the exchange reveal the listener's own understanding and interpretation).
5
The remainder of this section examines the interaction among market agents in an environment without any governance structure. Section 3 and 4 examine open and closed …rms as alternative governance mechanisms.
Bargaining
Market interaction o¤ers idea generators unrestricted matching with an in…nite set of free agents, not subject to any governance structure. We assume that listeners will not sign any contract before listening to an idea since blindly signing a contract before seeing the content of the commitment expose agents to a risk of extortion. (In the appendix we provide an extension that rationalizes this assumption). A talker must therefore reveal his idea to a listener without any contractual protection. If the listener is a complementor, it is e¢ cient for the two agents to implement the concept together, after bargaining on how to share its value z. Let the fraction retained by the talker be denoted by a. If the listener is a substitute, it is e¢ cient for the two agents to seek an e¢ cient continuation game, in which only one agent pursues the concept further. Idea stealing is an overt threat whenever the talker meets a substitute, and becomes a reality whenever the substitute is the one to pursue the idea further.
Following Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) , the bargaining process is modeled as an alternating o¤er bargaining game, where after each o¤er rejection there is an in…nitesimally small probability that a player exits the game. This speci…cation has several advantages. First, its equilibrium coincides with the Nash bargaining solution. Second, this speci…cation guarantees stationarity on and o¤ the equilibrium path, which considerably simpli…es the analysis. Speci…cally, while ideas may circulate via di¤erent agents, at any point in the game, only one player carries an idea further. This allows us to obtain a simple and intuitive bargaining outcome.
Consider …rst the case where a talker encounters a substitute. No joint implementation is possible and both are equally able to pursue the idea. Rather than competing, it is e¢ cient to coordinate on who will continue to pursue the idea. This is easy to enforce, because once the idea is disclosed, parties can easily write contracts. We assume that in this case they simply split the continuation value.
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Consider next the case where a talker (denoted by T ) encounters a complementor (denoted by C). T may be the idea generator, or a substitute that stole the idea. The e¢ cient bargaining outcome is to cooperate immediately, since the best alternative is that only one of them …nds a similarly complementary partner after some delay. To establish the equilibrium value of the talker's share, a, we compute each agent's outside options. Let D = 1 " be the discount factor for the delay of one talking round (so that as
To see this, note that C either …nds a substitute to T with probability and gets a share a; or, with probability , he …nds another complementor, in which case they cannot implement the concept, and they toss a fair coin as to who continues. Solving the above we obtain
, which for D ! 1 yields o C = 2 2 2 az. Using similar reasoning, T 's outside option in case of breakdown
We derive the Nash bargaining outcome, given by az
, solves for the bargaining share a:
Lemma 1: The more common is the complementary skill , the greater is the bargaining stake a gained by the talker, i.e.,
Lemma 1 is easily veri…ed by inspecting (1). They key intuition is that the talker is in a stronger bargaining position if the complementor's skills are easier to replace. The stake gained by either agent increases in the relative scarcity of its skill. Lemma 1 also con…rms that our choice of bargaining model leads to a reasonable and intuitive outcome. If the skills were equally frequent, i.e. = 1 2 , then the surplus is split, as a = 1 2 . For ! 0 we have a ! 0, and for ! 1 we have a ! 1.
Market rewards to invention
The ex-ante payo¤ for a talker sharing his idea in the market may now be determined. With probability , a talker …nds a complementor and bargains for a share az. With probability , he …nds a substitute, in which case they toss a fair coin. If he wins the coin toss, he moves into the next talking round, otherwise he exists. The utility of a talker is therefore given by
and using (1) we obtain
It is easy to verify that du T d > 0, so that a greater availability of complementors increases the talker's utility.
The utility for a listener is given by
We …rst assume that all agents attempt to generate ideas. In the …rst talking round, there is a mass of agents with ideas, who are matched with listeners. Of those ideas, are resolved, but ideas remain unresolved. Whether stolen or not, all unresolved ideas go into the second talking round. More generally, in the n th round n 1 ideas remain in circulation. In the …rst round any agent has a probability of becoming a listener. In the second round the number of incomplete ideas becomes . The total expected number of listening events is thus (1 + + 2 + :::), or .
Let u M be the expected utility of operating in the market, the sum of the expected gain from generating an idea, plus the gain of listening to others'ideas. Formally, we
Using (2) and (3) we obtain after transformations
This says that u M exactly equals the expected value created by investing to produce one idea. This occurs because, as long as all market participants contribute to idea creation, the expected loss from stolen ideas is matched on average by the expected gain from stealing other agent's ideas. Accordingly, the utility of operating in the market is independent of , the chance of …nding a complementor. Markets are e¢ cient at completing ideas, which circulate freely until someone …nds a complementor, so in equilibrium all ideas are completed. Yet so far we assumed have that market agents are willing to generate ideas, rather than just listening to others' ideas. The necessary condition for a positive return to generating ideas is u T > . Using (1), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 There are no ideas developed in the market, and thus no ideas to listen to, whenever
7 It is easy to verify that
The intuitive reason why the e¤ect of on u L is ambiguous is that the listener has a dual identify. He is not only a listener in the current talking round, but possibly also a talker in the next talking round.
Proposition 1 exposes the main weakness of the market as a governance system for idea exchange. Inventors may not appropriate enough value from their ideas to reward their e¤orts. Condition (5) identi…es the threshold cost of generating ideas ( M ) beyond which markets fail to generate ideas.
The comparative statics of M with respect to and z are obvious: idea generation is more attractive if ideas are less risky and more valuable. Less obvious is the e¤ect of the probability of meeting a complementor . It is easy to verify that
This suggests the following corollary.
Corollary to Proposition 1: Market agents will not generate any ideas if there are too few complementors, i.e., to low.
When complementary skills are rare, the net payo¤ to generating an idea becomes negative, since the idea generator faces a high chance of expropriation from substitute agents. Moreover, Lemma 1 states that even if the generator …nds a complementor, he has a weak bargaining position (low a), precisely because the complementor's skills are rare.
In conclusion, a market exchange for ideas (i.e. an open exchange system without any commitment) is ex-post e¢ cient in ensuring that ideas can circulate in an unconstrained set of agents, and all ideas are completed. Yet this form of exchange may fail to reward invention adequately. We now turn to …rms as alternative governance solutions.
Idea exchange in closed …rms
Consider now the …rm as an alternative governance mechanism for idea circulation. This section focus on closed …rms, meaning …rms that operate in isolation, without interacting with the market. The analysis of closed …rms is of interest by itself, and also provides a necessary building block for the analysis of section 4, concerning the interaction of markets and (open) …rms.
Firm reputation and employment contracts
We now introduce the …rm as a possible solution to the case of market failure, when the expected reward of sharing an idea in the market is too low to justify their generation cost, as under (5). Our notion of a …rm relies on two classical characteristics: reputation and authority. While individual actions are not widely observable, an agent may make a sunk investment into establishing a local reputation, by creating some arrangement by which his actions become visible to a subset of agents. Visibility of actions implies the possibility of a reputation equilibrium, where the observers believe the reputed agent until proven wrong (Kreps, 1986) .
If an agent is able to establish such a local reputation, he may use it not only to be the recipient of ideas, but he can also use it to establish honest dealing among the subset of agents. In other words, the reputed agent is able to create a …rm with a reputation for fair dealing with its employees. Moreover, the employment contract de…nes a legal boundary for the circulation of internal ideas. In our context it can be interpreted as the sale of future ideas to the …rm owner, plus a collective NDA covering ideas registered inside the …rm. Trade secret law, a standard feature of all labor contracts, commits employees not to appropriate any internal …rm project. As a result, once the idea is recorded as a …rm initiative, employees can exchange their ideas without the risk of theft. Naturally, this requires that the …rm monitors its boundaries, which may imply a cost (Liebeskind, 1997) . We will show later that …rms can protect internal ideas even when trade secret law is enforced imperfectly.
For a …rm to function as a reliable place of exchange of ideas, four incentive compatibility constraints have to be satis…ed. First, agents must be willing to sign a collective NDA agreement in the form of an employment contract. Second, employees must be willing to report their own ideas, thus e¤ectively relinquishing any ownership claim, in exchange for a promised reward. Third, the reputational value must be such that the …rm owner prefers to pay the reward rather than stealing reported ideas. Finally, the …rm has to be willing to monitor its boundaries, and pursue any idea theft by employees. In section 3.3 we derive the formal reputation condition.
Rewards to invention in a closed …rm
We assume that any agent can make a sunk investment K to create a …rm. 8 The sunk investment K creates visibility, and thus potential reputation, among a …xed number E of employees. We will assume that the number of employees is …xed to keep the analysis tractable. 9 For simplicity, once an owner commits to managing a …rm, he no longer has time to generate or complement ideas by himself.
The …rm can claim ownership over ideas once employees choose to disclose them; or more precisely, it can establish a claim which excludes all employees, but not external agents, at least until the idea is developed enough to be patentable.
When markets do not reward idea generation enough to justify invention, agents prefer to develop and disclose ideas inside …rms, where they are promised a fraction b of their value z. Upon disclosure, ideas are "recorded" as internal projects in a veri…able form. Thus "bureaucratic procedures"and a "paper trail"are essential for the internal reward system, and for internal ideas to be covered by trade secret laws. In the main model we assume that …rms can always prevent idea stealing. Section 5.1 explores how imperfections in enforcing trade secret law a¤ect the analysis.
Once a generator registers an idea within the …rm, he is assigned the task to implement it via internal matching. In managerial terms, he becomes an "internal project champion"or an "intrapreneur."Since no employee can leak the idea outside the …rm, the generator can count on cooperation from all internal listeners. Thus the …rm does not need to compensate listeners, as they cannot take ideas elsewhere. The utility of listening to ideas inside the …rm is therefore zero, i.e., giving feedback to colleagues'ideas is part of the job.
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To provide a symmetric treatment of markets and …rms, we assume that the chance of …nding a complementor inside the …rm and in the market is the same, given by . We further discuss this assumption in section 5.2. The probability that an idea …nds no match inside the …rm is given by E , and so the probability of internal completion is 1 E . Note that the probability of completion in the market is 1.
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Remark: The probability of idea completion inside the …rm is always lower than in the market. A closed …rm fails to complete all its internal ideas, whereas the market completes all ideas.
The circulation of ideas in closed …rm is less e¢ cient than in a market for two reasons. First, it is costly to set up a …rm. Second, the …rm allows only for a subset of possible matches. However, closed …rms may succeed when markets fail to reward idea generation. Under (5), the reward to operate in the market is zero, as the chance of listening to an idea is zero.
12 Thus the …rm owner simply rewards employees based on the value of the completed ideas they generate. Let the reward be a fraction b of its value, contingent on completion. The reward bz must be su¢ cient to compensate for the idea generation cost ( ), adjusted for the probability of success ( ), and the probability of completion (1 E ). The expected utility of generating an idea is given by u E = (1 E ) bz .
The …rm's optimal compensation is thus given by
Note that this optimal level of b also ensures disclosure. To see this more formally, note that (6) implies that the employee's return from disclosure is (1 E )bz = .
Without disclosure, the employee would have to leave the …rm to obtain market returns u T , which from (5) is always less than .
The expected pro…t per period of a …rm (gross of any reputational investment costs) is given by = E(1 E ) (1 b)z . Substituting for b we obtain
The comparative statics are intuitive: is increasing in , z and , and decreasing in .
Credible Reputation
This subsection solves for the reputation constraint, i.e. the condition that ensures that …rm owners choose to maintain their reputation. In principle, a …rm owner could renege by failing to reward employees for their ideas, or he could misattribute ideas to other employees, etc.. From a model perspective, we only need to concern ourselves with the maximal deviation. It is easy to see that the most pro…table deviation for the owner is to let the employees do all the work, and then not pay them, i.e., refuse to pay the bonus bz for completed ideas. 13 The maximal deviation for a …rm owner would be to simultaneously refuse to pay all employees, in the rare event that they all had a completed idea at the same time. The value of this maximal deviation is Ebz. With this we can state the reputation condition as follows:
Reputation condition: A …rm owner can credibly commit to maintain the …rm's reputation if
This condition is always satis…ed for su¢ ciently close to 1, and we assume it satis…ed for the remainder of the analysis.
Comparing closed …rms and markets
In section 4 we examine the coexistence of markets and …rms. As a preliminary step, we contrast the key properties of markets and …rms taken in isolation. In particular, we identify the critical parameter ranges for which either of these forms of exchange succeed in supporting idea generation. Note that if markets can support idea generation, …rms are a dominated form of idea exchange, since they require …xed costs and limit the rate of idea completion.
A potential …rm owner enters the market whenever the life-time value of the …rm 1 outweighs the required investment cost K. We de…ne a critical value F such that ( F ) 1 = K. Since ( F ) decreases in ; F is the critical value above which …rms do not generate ideas, i.e. are not viable. Using (7) we obtain
Figure 1 depicts M from (5) and F from (9). The value of ideas (z) is on the horizontal and the cost of generating ideas ( ) is on the vertical axis.
Proposition 2 If markets fail, closed …rms are feasible for 2 ( M ; F ). The range ( M ; F ) exist whenever the return to ideas (z) is not too low.
Figure 1 reveals that markets work well for ideas which are valuable if successful and not too expensive to develop (high z, low ). Thus highly pro…table innovations can be well provided by independent agents, while established corporations have a competitive advantage in intermediate value innovations that require relatively large investment. Empirically, established …rms are good at incremental innovations, while radical innovations are often created by market-based entrepreneurs (Christensen, 1997) . Our analysis suggests that this may be a natural result of the comparative advantages of …rms and markets.
Coexistence of open …rms and markets
We now examine the full equilibrium model where …rms and markets interact. The previous section assumed that …rms do not allow employees to leave to pursue ideas not resolved internally. This assumption is reasonable under some circumstances, such as if it is di¢ cult for the owner to ensure that a departing employee is only taking his own ideas, and not any other trade secrets. We consider here the case where owners can monitor this process, and allow their employees to leave to develop speci…c internal ideas externally, in order to extract some additional value. We assume that departing employees are allowed to develop registered ideas in a start-up, but not within another established …rm. We loosely justify this assumption arguing that …rms do not wish to grant advantages to large competitors.
Under (5) the reward to generating ideas in the market system is negative, so all ideas are generated inside …rms. Open …rms create idea mobility, which allows market agents to hear ideas leaving …rms. As before, an idea may be shared with all …rms employees in one period, and ideas circulating in the market are completed within one period. We assume that employees commit to stay with their …rm for at least one period, so that ideas not completed in a …rm can move to the market after one period delay.
Agents may be of three types: …rm owners, employees and market agents, with densities n F , n E and n M respectively. Note that n E = En F and n M = 1 n E n F = 1 (1 + E)n F . Section 4.3 uses a free entry condition to determine the equilibrium density of …rms n F . In this section we assume that K varies across individuals, re ‡ect-ing for instance di¤erent initial endowments of individual reputation. Speci…cally, let K be distributed according to some cumulative distribution (K). For simplicity we assume that there is never a shortage of potential employees, so that (1 + E)n F < 1. This assumption is satis…ed by assuming that K = +1 for at least n E agents.
Let us brie ‡y highlight some important characteristics of the coexistence equilibrium between open …rms and markets.
Remark:
The equilibrium where open …rms and market coexist has the following properties:
(i) all ideas are created inside …rms; (ii) some ideas are completed within …rms, all others are taken by the inventor into the market for completion; (iii) all ideas that were not completed inside …rms are completed in the market with a one period delay.
The payo¤ to be a market agent
In the model with open …rms, market agents get to listen to ideas, even though under (5) market agents do not generate ideas. Their utility u M consists solely of the expected value of listening to others'ideas. This value depends on the frequency of ideas circulating in the market, which in turn depends on the density of …rms, as well as their e¢ ciency at completing ideas.
Each …rm generates a stock of ideas per period, but completes only a fraction 1 E , so that the total number of spin-o¤ ideas per period is n S = n E E . Note that as n S employees leave …rms at the end of the period to become market agents, they are replaced by n S market agents that become employees, thus preserving the steady state proportions. The probability for an agent to listen to an idea in the …rst talking round is = n S n M , where represents the fraction of people with ideas in the market, over the total number of people in the market. Of all the ideas, a fraction will be resolved in the …rst talking round. In the second talking round there are n S ideas, so that the expected number of ideas to listen to in that round is n S n M = .
The total expected number of listening events per period is thus (1 + + 2 ::) = .
, n E = En F and n M = 1 n F En F , we note that
This generates the following useful Lemma.
Lemma 2: The frequency with which free agents hear new ideas, , is increasing in the density of …rms n F .
A greater density of …rms increases the reward for market agents, because more …rms means more ideas that escape into the market. This identi…es an important symbiotic relationship between …rms and markets.
The expected reward to listening is given by u L as determined by equation (3). Thus u M = u L . Using (10) we obtain
This allows us to state the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (i ) An agent's utility in the market u M is increasing in the density of …rms n F .
(ii) For a given density of …rms n F , u M is decreasing in , and increasing in and z.
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 3 describes the reservation utility for employees. This is characterized by the M curve in Figure 2 , which presents demand and supply of labor. Clearly, u M is increasing in n F . The intuition for this is that if there are more …rms, then there are more spin-o¤s, and thus more ideas circulating in the market.
Proposition 3 establishes the comparative statics of u M . Naturally, u M is increasing in the value of the …rm, thus in and z. The fact that it is also decreasing in is due to the cumulation of three e¤ects. First, from (10) we note that the fraction of ideas going to market agents, given by , is decreasing in . The intuition is that with higher , more ideas are already resolved inside …rms. Second, the term 1 is clearly decreasing in , and represents the speed of completion of ideas entering the market. The faster ideas are resolved in the market, the fewer chances market agents get to hear ideas. Third, in section 2.3 we already noted that the e¤ect of on u L is ambiguous. The formal proof in the appendix shows that the second e¤ect always dominates the third, so that u M is unambiguously decreasing in . Figure 3 represents this as an outward shift of the M curve.
Firm entry
We now turn to the analysis of …rm pro…ts, and the related entry decision. In addition to the gain (1 b)z from completed internal ideas, open …rms can gain from incomplete ideas which leave the …rm. An option is for the …rm owner to take a stake in each departing employee's venture (often called a spin o¤). In this model, this has the same e¤ect as reducing the bonus b, so we assume that the employee retains the full value of the idea after leaving. The employee's utility of generating an idea inside the …rm is given by u E = (1 E )bz + E u T , where u T is the utility gained by taking the idea out into the market, discounted by because of the one period delay. In equilibrium, the per period reward to employees must match the payo¤ to operate in the market, namely u M . The …rm's optimal policy is to set rewards so that u E = u M .
Thus the optimal value of b satis…es
Using our results for u T and , we can also rewrite this as
The equilibrium density of …rms is determined from a free entry condition. Potential owners compare the investment cost K against the discounted expected value of …rm pro…ts, given by 1 , minus the opportunity cost of not starting a …rm, given by the utility to operate in the market, namely u M 1 . The number of agents wanting to start …rms is given by n F = ( b K) where b K is the …xed cost of the marginal entrant. We have b
It is easy to see that the reputation condition for the model with open …rms is now given by
With this, we can state the following proposition about …rm entry.
Proposition 4 (i) The equilibrium density of …rms n F is decreasing in u M .
(ii) For a given value of u M , n F is increasing in , , z, and decreasing in .
Proposition 4 characterizes the F curve in Figure 2 . This curve represents the density of …rms, as a function of the utility of market agents, which equals the employee's outside option, and thus the cost of hiring. Proposition 4 establishes that n F is a decreasing function of u M , implying that the F curve is downward sloping. The intuition is simply that a higher market utility increases the cost of hiring employees, and thus reduces the optimal density of …rms.
Proposition 4 also establishes the comparative statics for n F . The intuition for , z and are straightforward, all relating directly to the ex-ante value of an idea. A higher discount factor (corresponding to a lower discount rate) increases the lifetime utility of starting a …rm. The most interesting result concerns the fact that n F is increasing in . The key intuition is that with more complementors, …rms are more likely to complete ideas internally. A higher value of also increases the utility an employee receives from doing a spin-o¤. The comparative static result for is represented in Figure 3 , which shows that a higher value of shifts the F curve outwards.
Coexistence equilibrium
We are now in a position to characterize the comparative statics of the equilibrium where …rms and markets coexist, which is characterized by the two equilibrium conditions (11) and (13). Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the equilibrium. Since the M is upward sloping and the F curve downward sloping, there exists a unique equilibrium. For expositional convenience we ignore all trivial cases where the M and F curve intersect at a corner, such as n F = 0.
We focus on the comparative static results on the equilibrium density of …rms n F . In this model, the number of …rms determines the number of agents that generate ideas, and thus the degree of innovation in the economy. Figures 3-5 demonstrate the comparative static e¤ects for u M .
Proposition 5 (i) An increase in the number of complementors (higher ), shifts out the F curve and shifts down the M curve, resulting in a higher density of …rms (higher n F ). See Figure 3 .
(ii) An increase in the value of ideas (higher z), or the probability of generating ideas (higher ), shifts out the F curve and shifts up the M curve, resulting in an ambiguous net e¤ect on the density of …rms. See Figure 4 . If n F is su¢ ciently small (large), the net e¤ect is positive (negative).
(iii) A higher cost of generating ideas (higher ), a higher cost of entry (shifting up the distribution (K)), or a lower discount factor (lower ) shift back the F curve without a¤ecting the M curve, resulting in a lower density of …rms (lower n F ). See Figure 5 .
Figures 3-5 illustrates the main comparative statics of the model. Figure 3 shows that the e¤ect of increasing the number of complementors increases the density of …rms, and thus the number of ideas generated in the economy. The intuition is that this leads to more internal idea completion, making …rms more pro…table. Moreover, with more complementors, the returns to market agents are lower, thus reducing the cost of hiring employees, further increasing …rm pro…ts.
The result of part (ii) (i.e., Figure 4 ) may seem surprising at …rst. Intuitively, a higher value of ideas should increase …rm pro…ts and thus increase the density of …rms. Indeed, this corresponds to the outward shift of the F curve. However, our analysis identi…es a second e¤ect. A higher value of ideas also increases the utility of market agents, and thus the cost of hiring employees, as represented by the upward shift of the M curve. The net e¤ect of these two e¤ects is ambiguous. In the appendix we derive an analytical expression for this trade-o¤ and show that for su¢ ciently low values of n F (this occurs when the distribution puts a lot of weight on higher values of K) the net e¤ect is always positive, but for su¢ ciently high values of n F , the net e¤ect is always negative.
The result of part (iii) (i.e., Figure 5 ) is again very intuitive. Higher idea generation costs do not a¤ect the utility of market agents, since they do not invest in generating ideas, but a¤ect …rms negatively, as they bear this cost. As a result, higher reward costs lead to fewer …rms. The same result also holds for entry costs, which are directly borne by …rm owners. The e¤ect of the discount factor is analogous.
Comparing open and closed …rms
In this section we compare closed and open …rms. Market agents clearly prefer open …rms, since this creates an out ‡ow of ideas to the market. Employees similarly prefer open …rms, since their compensation now must match the increased payo¤ of market agents. The interesting question is whether …rm owners bene…t from the move to openness.
From the perspective of the individual …rm owner, it is always bene…cial to have an open …rm, as it gives its employees an additional utility of E u T , which the …rm recoups by lowering its bonus payment b. The question remains whether …rms bene…t collectively from mobility, as it produces a negative externality. If one …rm allows its employees to do a spin-o¤, this increases the expected utility for all market agents, which in turn raises the cost of hiring for all …rms. The following Proposition considers the equilibrium e¤ect of mobility.
Proposition 6 Mobility increases (decreases) …rm pro…ts ( ) and the equilibrium density of …rms (n F ) if the density of …rms is su¢ ciently small (large).
The formal proof is in the appendix. The equilibrium e¤ect of mobility on …rm pro…ts depends on the relative strength of two e¤ects. There is a positive e¤ect of mobility, coming from the better utilization of internally generated ideas. With mobility, employees obtain a return in the market from those ideas that have no internal match. The negative e¤ect of mobility comes from the externality that spin-o¤s have on the utility of market agents. Proposition 6 shows that the relative strength of these two e¤ects depends on the density of …rms itself (which re ‡ects the distribution of entry costs). Intuitively, if there are only a few …rms, then open …rms do better than closed ones, because they use fully the ideas their employees generate, while the externality e¤ect is small. For a high density of …rms, however, the externality may overshadow the utilization e¤ect. Put di¤erently, the utilization e¤ect does not really depend on the number of spin-o¤s, but the externality e¤ect is directly related to the number of spin-o¤s, and thus the density of …rms.
Extensions

Imperfect prevention of idea stealing
The analysis so far assumes that the …rm can prevent employees from stealing internal ideas. In reality, the …rm's monitoring may be incomplete, or the enforcement of trade secret laws may be imperfect. We here brie ‡y sketch how imperfect prevention a¤ects our results. The appendix derives the formal extension.
Consider a simple speci…cation where employees face some probability of being caught stealing ideas, in which case they forfeit the value of the idea and may su¤er a lower utility for one period. Intuitively, to preserve free circulation of ideas inside the …rm, the owner now needs to provide more incentives to employees.
Which employees are most likely to steal ideas? Since …rms exist only when equation (6) is satis…ed, we deduce that a generator prefers to circulate the idea inside the …rm, rather than taking it outside. It is also easy to show that substitutes would not in general steal an internal idea. Everyone needs to wait until the next period to take the idea outside. If the generator does not …nd an internal match, he can pursue the idea next period with no threat of being pursued. Knowing that he has a natural handicap, the substitute prefers not to compete, and hence never steals the idea. This does not apply to an individual deviation by a complementor, who may have a higher chance of completion. Indeed, we can focus on the most pro…table deviation, which is when the generator defects jointly with a complementor. Since they already know that they are a good match, they can avoid the risk of expropriation from an unlucky match in the market. To prevent any such defection, the …rm owner needs to reward not only the generator but also the complementor for any internal idea completion.
The following Proposition examines how imperfect prevention a¤ects …rm pro…ts and viability, as well as the rewards to the complementor.
Proposition 7 There exist critical values 0 and 1 with 0 < 0 < 1 < 1, such that (i) for all < 0 , the …rm is not viable; (ii) for 0 < < 1 , the …rm's pro…ts are increasing in , and the rewards given to the complementor are decreasing in ; (iii) for > 1 the …rm's pro…ts are una¤ected by . The critical value 0 is increasing in K and m.
A key intuition is that while paying the complementor is costly, the …rm might be able to o¤set that cost by lowering its payments b to the generator. The proof shows that if prevention is su¢ ciently good ( > 1 ), then the …rm does not incur any costs at all, because it has some slack in reducing b without a¤ecting the incentive to generate ideas. The optimal compensation consists of rewarding both the generator and the complementor. For this region we note that even if trade secret law is imperfect, this does not a¤ect out equilibrium outcome. For intermediate values of ( 0 < < 1 ) there is no more slack: both the incentive constraint for the generator and the no-defection constraint for the complementor are binding. The optimal compensation again consists of rewarding both the generator and the complementor. In this region, however, imperfections in trade secret law are costly to the …rm. For su¢ ciently low ( < 0 ), satisfying the incentive constraints of both the generator and the complementor becomes too costly for the …rm. Since it cannot capture enough of the value generated by the internal circulation of ideas, the …rm ceases to be viable. Overall, the main insight is that while the …rm requires some protection through trade secret laws, it does not require perfect enforcement, nor perfect monitoring.
Specialized …rms
To o¤er a fair comparison of …rms and markets, the model assumes that their probability of harbouring a complementor ( ) is the same. It is interesting to informally consider the possibility that …rms specialize in di¤erent types of ideas. Specialized …rms may attract employees with more complementary capabilities, and this may increases the chance of …nding complementors inside the …rm. In our context is is not obvious that …rms can plan their composition to favor novel ideas, which represent innovative rather than predictable combinations of factors. Yet …rms focusing on speci…c areas may be able to a¤ect their internal rate of completion for related ideas.
From (7) we know that the …rm's pro…ts are increasing in . Part of this bene…t comes from a lower cost of providing incentives to generators (see (6)). Another bene…t of specialization could be a higher ability to challenge idea theft, because the …rm can more easily lay a claim to a better de…ned set of ideas. A natural cost may be that the likelihood of generating ideas ( ) might be lower, because the …rm is only receptive to a smaller set of ideas.
In an earlier version (Hellmann and Perotti, 2005) we discuss a model extension where some employees leave prior to disclosure. This happens when their ideas …t poorly with the …rm's specialization, so that disclosing the idea would be a waste of time and e¤ort.
14 The empirical literature (e.g., Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) suggest that lack of …t is an important determinant of spin-o¤s activity, and that …rms often agree to let employees go. Gene Amdahl, for example, pleaded for a long time with his colleagues at IBM to implement his ideas, before …nally starting Amdahl Computers. However, there are other examples where employees left their employer without disclosing anything about their ideas or entrepreneurial ambitions.
Rewards to entrepreneurship
It is sometimes believed that the returns for developing a new venture are greater for entrepreneurs (market agents) than intrapreneurs (employees). The model identi…es some important caveats for this common perception.
First, there is a risk of idea expropriation, so that the successful entrepreneur may not be the original generator. In our model, the probability that an idea generator gets to develop the new venture is given by M = 2 1 + < 1. This contrasts with the probability of doing an internal venture, given by
Second, the rewards in the market may go disproportionately to the complementor, as revealed by the equilibrium value of a in equation (1). Interestingly, both the …rst and second of these e¤ects disadvantage entrepreneurs especially in the case of few complementors (low ).
Rewards inside …rms may thus look less generous when compared with the returns of successful entrepreneurs, but they may be more reliable, less risky. Indeed, one important …nding of the model is that intrapreneurs have many opportunities to discuss their ideas inside the …rm, without fear of appropriation, whereas entrepreneurs have to worry about appropriation every time they discuss their ideas. 
The case of Silicon Valley
Our argument that ideas are generated inside …rms may seem at odds with the common perception that the most innovative regions, such as Silicon Valley, thrives on entrepreneurial activity. Yet, established …rms appear to play a crucial role in the productive structure in Silicon Valley. According to Business Week, Silicon Valley accounted for a remarkable 20% of the largest high tech …rms in the world in 1997.
Moreover, any in-depth study of Silicon Valley notes that many innovations (especially early stage ideas) are originally developed inside established …rms, but that entrepreneurs are often more adept at developing them. Indeed, entrepreneurs are often not the original inventors, but rather the ones who develop others'promising ideas. The best-known example is probably Steve Jobs and Steven Wozniak, who took their inspiration for Apple Computers from research at Xerox Parc. More generally, any account of Silicon Valley's success includes a long list of novel ventures started by individuals who left employment with a larger …rm. The semiconductor industry, for example, is famous for its genealogy of …rms, where each generation of new …rms was started by employees leaving their parent …rms. Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) provide broader cross-sectional evidence on the role that large corporations play in entrepreneurial spawning. Consistent with our mobility model, they …nd that more open …rms tend to spawn more ventures.
Along similar lines, Aoki (2001) and Saxenian (1994) argue that …rms with porous boundaries create a symbiotic relationship with free market entrepreneurs. In contrast, a secretive corporate culture which resists interaction with markets may suffocate the circulation and thus subsequent elaboration of internally generated ideas. The hierarchical approach to R&D in Japan and Europe, as well as in the large high tech companies on Route 128 in Massachusetts, has been unfavorably contrasted with the loosely organized open environment of Silicon Valley in California, whose success is attributed to a free movement of ideas and individuals creating innovative ventures via informal arrangements. The intense exchange of ideas in Silicon Valley may seem puzzling, since California actually has a fairly weak tradition of protecting intellectual property, so that is not clear how idea generation may be rewarded (see Gilson 1999 , Hyde, 1998 . Our model o¤ers a clue, showing that entrepreneurial …rm formation and large multi-product …rms are actually symbiotic. Large …rms are a natural source of innovative ideas, yet many of these ideas can only be realized if they are allowed to move to a free exchange system. In turn, a dynamic market will attract skilled, entrepreneurial individuals only if there are enough …rms from which ideas may leave, seeking elaboration. The open environment in Silicon Valley may thus thrive thanks to the historical presence of large …rms in the area, which have acted as incubators of new ideas, particularly those which are costly to develop.
Conclusions
We have proposed a novel trade-o¤ between the necessity to protect idea generation and the need to share ideas, in order to screen and elaborate them. The free circulation of ideas is e¢ cient for the elaboration of incomplete concepts, but fails to reward personal e¤ort for generating novel concepts. Individuals may voluntarily join close exchange systems, such as …rms, to ensure that their initiatives receive support and feedback without being stolen. Firm ownership represent a claim on the use of registered ideas vis-à-vis employees. This creates a legal …rm boundary which dis-courages the escape of ideas. The internal structure of the …rm is designed to ensure a controlled circulation of ideas, along with a credible reward system. Our model also suggests that there is a natural symbiosis between the ability of …rms to sustain exploration in ambitious ideas and the comparative advantage of market in screening and elaborating ideas which leave …rms.
There are several interesting directions for future research which we intend to pursue. An example is the issue of self-selection of agents in …rms and markets, which is a¤ected by di¤erences in the reward to complementors inside and outside …rms. For instance, agents with a greater predisposition to operate as complementors to incomplete ideas may be better o¤ outside …rms, since inside they have no bargaining power to take their skills somewhere else. Examples may be experienced serial entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, seasoned angel investors, and professional mentors (including lawyers and consultants) who specialize in working with inventors/entrepreneurs, helping them to turn their ideas into viable businesses (Lee et. al., 2000) . Such specialized complementors often organize alternative organizational structures, such as partnership and networks.
Another compelling research question concerns the generation and circulation of ideas in academia (e.g. Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein, 2005) . Although academic researchers rarely capture the value created by their discoveries, the academic publication system may ensure some alternative reward mechanism. More generally, it is important to understand what institutional arrangements support a free circulation of ideas, a valuable public good.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
To see that M and F curves intersect for a positive value of z, consider …rst z su¢ ciently small. We have F < M which follows from the fact that as z ! 0, we have M = 0 but F < 0. For z su¢ ciently large, however, we have F > M .
To see this, compare the slope coe¢ cients of z, noting that (1
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is based on taking derivatives of u M , using (11). We have
Proof of Proposition 4
The prof is based on taking derivatives of n F , using (13) and (12). We have
For n F ! 0 we have sign( dn F dz ) > 0 and for (1 + E)n F ! 1 we have sign( dn F dz ) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
In the case of no mobility, the …rm pro…ts are = E[(1 E )z ] m while with mobility, pro…ts are = E[(1
The net e¤ect of mobility on …rm pro…ts is denoted by B and is thus given by B = E u T u M .
Using (11) and (2), we have
Proof of Proposition 7
Let u (with u < u M ) be the one-period utility of a disgraced idea stealer. For simplicity we retain the assumption that leaving the …rm always takes one period. We denote the payment to the complementor by b C z. The …rm's payments b and b C have to satisfy three constraints. First, b and b C have to satisfy the participation constraint, which is now given by
Second, b has to satisfy the incentive constraint for idea generation, given by b(1 E ) z + E u T . Third, b and b C have to satisfy the incentive constraint for no joint defection, given by
(1 E ) z , this reduces to the following two conditions:
and
Note that #( ) is a decreasing function of . At = 1 we have #( ) < 0 so that the second constraint is not binding at all, i.e., the no defection constraint is never binding. This means that for su¢ ciently large, imperfect prevention does to impose any additional cost. For ! 0, we can rewrite the no defection constraint as
Assuming that is close to 1, the …rm has to pay out almost all of its revenues to the generator and complementor. This means that the …rm would not be able to recover its …xed costs. To …nd the critical value, below which the cannot recover its …xed costs, we consider
(1 E ) z as above and where we assume that the no defection constraint is binding, so that b C ( ) = #( ) z . In this case, we note that b C ( ) is a decreasing function of , as noted in the Proposition. Moreover, ( ) is an increasing function of . A …rm remains viable as long as 1
We thus de…ne 0 implicitly from ( 0 ) = u M + (1 )K. It is easy to verify that 0 is increasing in K and m. So far we have assumed that the no defection constraint is binding. Comparing the two conditions b C z u M (E 1) and b C z #( ) we implicitly de…ne the critical value 1 such that
. It is immediate that for > 1 the condition b C z #( ) is no longer binding. In this case, the …rm can set b and b C so as to satisfy the …rst two constraints as in section 3. For > 1 the …rm's pro…ts thus no longer depend on , since a¤ects a non-binding constraint.
It is easy to see that substitute employees will not steal ideas, since it takes one period to leave the …rm. Even when the generator does not …nd an internal match, a substitute employee will not pursue a competing venture. Having two agents pursuing the idea is never e¢ cient, unlike the asymmetric equilibria where either the generator or the substitute employee pursue the idea. In section 2.2., the two markets agents are perfectly symmetric and thus need to negotiate which one carries the idea forward. When one of them is supported by the …rm, however, a competing venture by a substitute employees is discouraged, as it faces the threat to be sued by the …rm for violation of trade secrets. Thus the focal equilibrium becomes the one where only the original generator pursues the idea, and all substitute employees prefer not to compete.
Extension: Refusal of NDA in market exchange
Is it possible to protect an incomplete idea by writing an ex-ante contract? Any idea which may be explained verbally may be written down in words, so it should in principle be contractible. In practice, contracts that protect against idea stealing, e.g. non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) are rarely used. We sketch here a simple rationale for refusing to sign NDAs, namely that they expose the signer to the risk of being falsely accused of stealing ideas.
Let T be a talker who requests a NDA before disclosing an idea, and L the listener whom is asked to sign it. Suppose the NDA can indeed protect the contracted idea, but it may be so generic so as to enable T to sue L for infringement, even when L is only using his own ideas (for instance, because the NDA is very generic, or it is tailored to cover ideas L already has). In case of such an opportunistic lawsuit, let be the expected penalty that L has to transfer to T . For simplicity, we assume that is exogenous, and that there are no additional legal costs. Of course, the risk of expropriation may be compensated by an ex-ante payment by the agent requesting a NDA (assuming no wealth constraints).
Suppose there are two types of talkers. The …rst type, a legitimate talker, truly has an idea, and does not have the ability to pursue a rent-seeking lawsuit. The second type is an opportunistic talker who has no ideas, but is skilled at pursuing a legal claim of contract breach to blackmail L. Let s be the proportion of opportunistic talkers in the population.
If a legitimate talker does not request a NDA contract, he can obtain a utility as in (2). If he does, his utility is as follows. Let be the payment that T pays for every NDA. The expected number of talking rounds is 1 , so that a legitimate talker seeking a match faces expected NDA costs of . The NDA contract ensures no idea stealing, so that T always obtains his contracted share of the value of the idea, which we denote by a n . Using the same reasoning as before, T 's utility with a NDA contract is given by u T;n = + a n z + Du T , so that for D ! 1 we have u T;n = a n z .
Note that, while T has Du T;n as outside option, L has no outside option since he is contractually committed not to steal the idea. From the Nash bargaining solution,
we have a n z = 1 2 z + 1 2 Du T;n . For D ! 1 we have a n = 1 z . After transformations, the utility that T obtains by asking for a NDA is given by u T;n = z 2 . Higher NDA payments thus weaken a legitimate talker's bargaining power, as they increase the cost of seeking other listeners. A legitimate talker is willing to o¤er a transfer for a NDA as long as u T;n u T , z 2 2 1 + 2 z , = 2 1 + 2 z 2 . Opportunistic talkers, however, are willing to o¤er any amount up to for a NDA. We focus on the case > , when rent-seeking lawsuits are a non-trivial threat for L. For any payment > , L realizes that only an opportunist could have made the o¤er, and thus refuses to sign the NDA. For any < , L's expected return from signing a NDA is (1 s)( + a n z) s , which simpli…es to (1 s)2 s . Thus we can conclude that L is never willing to sign an NDA agreement as long as s > s = 2 2 + .
This simple model extension shows that as long there may be rent-seeking agents, the only equilibrium is that listeners always refuse to sign NDAs to avoid exposure to blackmail. The condition is likely to be satis…ed, because entry by rent seekers will persist as long as there are pro…ts to be made from mimicking honest agents. This is consistent with our assumption that limited observability impedes individual reputation, whether positive or negative. 
